Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados vol. 53 n. 4 Rio de Janeiro 2010
Abstract
Democracies have adopted different legislative models to regulate election finance: maximum limits to contributions, bans on donations by companies that provide public services or operate government concessions, and disclosure of private donations and public funds to cover campaign expenditures. The current study's underlying hypothesis is that there is no association between the legislation's rigor and improvement in indicators of institutional transparency. The study analyzes the extent to which different types of institutional formats like democracy, presidentialism, type of electoral slate, and size of voting districts, as well as economic development variables, can explain the failure of electoral legislation to produce transparency in election finance.
Keywords: electoral legislation, election finance, transparency
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582010000400002
When laws fail to produce the expected results: election finance from a comparative perspective
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