Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados vol. 45 n. 2 Rio de Janeiro 2002
Abstract
In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Legislators have the right to amend the bill, but only if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may not authorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also the executive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be appropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability of resources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not only restrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at low costs its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the Brazilian President rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests by executing their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally, punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments.
Keywords: executive-legislative, Brazil, budgetary process, coalition-based presidential system
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582002000200004
Strategic Behavior in a Coalition-Based Presidential System: Executive-Legislative Relations in the Budgetary Process in Brazil
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