Dados es una de las principales publicaciones de ciencias sociales en América Latina. Creada en 1966, publica trabajos inéditos e innovadores, procedentes de investigaciones académicas, de autores brasileños y extranjeros. Editada por IESP-UERJ, tiene como objetivo conciliar el rigor científico y la excelencia académica con un énfasis en el debate público basado en el análisis de temas sustantivos en la sociedad y la política.
Dados vol. 45 n. 2 Rio de Janeiro 2002
Resumen
In Brazil the executive has exclusive rights to initiate the annual budget. Legislators have the right to amend the bill; but only if those amendments are compatible with the multi-year budget plan elaborated by the executive as well as with the law on budgetary guidelines. Moreover, congress may not authorize expenditures that exceed the budgetary revenue. It is also the executive, who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be appropriated, as the appropriation is contingent on the availability of resources in the national treasury. This paper argues that those rules not only restrict congressional action, but also enable the president to preserve at low costs its coalition inside Congress. It shows strong evidence that the Brazilian President rewards those legislators who most vote for his interests by executing their individual amendments to the annual budget and, equally, punishes those who vote less by not executing their individual amendments.
Palabras-clave: executive-legislative; Brazil; budgetary process; coalition-based presidential system.
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582002000200004
Comportamento Estratégico em Presidencialismode Coalizão: As Relações entre Executivo e Legislativo na Elaboração do Orçamento Brasileiro
Português do Brasil
English