Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados n. 21 Rio de Janeiro 1979
Abstract
This article analyzes the cassations of federal deputies during the fifth and sixth (Brazilian) legislatures, in an attempt to pinpoint the factors which determine the possibilities of a politician's being cassated. This goal is based on the assumption that cassations are neither accidental nor random: they follow from definite policies. The first waves of cassations were fundamentally aimed at the Nationalist Parliamentary Front. Data about the cassations were taken from the Diário Oficial, and data about the Nationalist Parliamentary Front (FPN) were .taken from a list compiled by Osny Duarte Pereira and from two interviews with FPN leaders, who classified deputies as either nonmembers, accidental or peripheral members, or members of the inside group, whose attendance at FPN meetings and functions - as well as their role in the FPN - qualified them as being more important than the peripheral members. These three categories were then tabulated against the categories of "cassated" and "not cassated". The gamma ordinal correlation coefficient (+ .86) reveals the relationship between being a FPN member and the probability of being cassated. Controlling by party and region, the relationships persist: all the members of the inside group were cassated and the percentage of peripheral members who were cassated is substantially higher than the percentage of nonmembers who were. After the FPN was eliminated, the validity of cassation as a legal instrument was broadened. During the sixth legislature it was used, fundamentally, to eliminate opposition to the regime. Nominal voting on seven important projects enabled an index of opposition to support for the government to be compiled. The voting on each one of these projects is related to the probability of being cassated (p < .0001 for all of them). Moreover, the index compiled from the voting on the seven projects is related to the probability of being cassated within each party: 43% of the Arena members who voted against the government were cassated, in contrast to less than 1 % of those who voted with; 45% of the MDB members who voted against the government were cassated, but only 37 .5% of those who abstained (intermediates), and none of those who voted with the government, were cassated. The existence of at least two cassation policies, therefore, is shown - one aimed at eliminating the Nationalist Parliamentary Front, and the second intended to control opposition in the Congress itself.
As Políticas de Cassações
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