Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados vol. 48 n. 3 Rio de Janeiro jul./set. 2005
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Abstract
One aspect the literature overlooks on the effects of labor regulation of labor market efficiency is the degree of the legislation's effectiveness, i.e., its actual enforcement in daily work relations. Even the more sophisticated econometric studies (which take into account the effects of interaction between labor market regulatory institutions in explaining its dynamics) leave this central issue aside, namely enforcement versus non-enforcement of the law. Keeping this issue in mind, we seek to answer the following question in this article: given that the effectiveness of labor legislation depends on the interaction between the overall sanctions and the probability of the employer getting caught breaking the law, and given that the law's effectiveness is a decisive aspect for the real measurement of a country's labor costs, to what extent is the Brazilian labor inspection system designed to meet its objective, namely to enforce the law?
Keywords: labor legislation, labor inspection, construction industry
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582005000300001
Labor inspection in Brazil
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