Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados vol. 46 n. 4 Rio de Janeiro 2003
Abstract
Research on political institutions suggests that sub-national factors affect the proclivity of legislators from the same party or coalition to vote together. We estimate the effects of such forces operating at the State-level - intra-list electoral competition, and alliance with governors. We propose that larger cohorts, in which the imperative for legislators to distinguish themselves from the group is stronger, should be less unified than smaller cohorts. We also derive from theoretical hypotheses that cohorts allied with governors may be either more or less unified than other cohorts. We analyze unity among coalition cohorts on recorded floor votes in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies. We find support for the hypothesis that larger cohorts are less unified, but detect no net effect of alliance with governors on cohort voting unity. Governors are not dominant brokers of legislative coalitions, suggesting that the net gubernatorial effect is contingent on factors that shape their influence relative to national-level legislative actors.
Keywords: legislatures, voting, governors, electoral rules, coalitions
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582003000400005
State-level institutional effects on legislative coalition unity in Brazil
Português do Brasil
Español