Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados vol. 46 n. 4 Rio de Janeiro 2003
Abstract
This article analyzes whether the pork barrel political approach really exists in the context of legislative output by the Brazilian Congress. According to the author's argument, in the case of medium-large districts, multi-member districts (MMDs) increase the costs of investment in pork barrel bills of law. In addition, members of the Brazilian Congress face high legislative output costs that increase the incentives to avoid pork barrel strategies. The author investigates hypotheses on bills that were either approved or rejected by Congress, as well as those vetoed by the Executive, from 1991 to 2002. The results provide significant evidence for the author's theoretical argument. The study concludes that: (1) pork barrel bills are quantitatively insignificant in Brazil, (2) members of the Brazilian Congress invest much of their time and effort in pursuit of broader interests, and (3) seniority and internal law-making procedures can explain approved versus rejected distributive bills.
Keywords: legislative output, pork barrel politics, personal vote
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582003000400003
The content of Brazilian legislative output: national laws or pork barrel politics?
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