Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados vol. 32 n. 1 Rio de Janeiro 1989
Abstract
One of the pillars of corporatist systems of interest representation is the centralization of authority within union confederations. Why unions have delegated authority to an union confederation in some countries but not in others is the subject of this paper. Centralization enhances the influence of unions on policies that affect all unions in similar ways. Decentralization allows unions greater freedom to enter alliances with their employers in pursuit of policies that divide unions in diligent industries. Thus the questions of union centralization is approached from the perspective of unions' policy goals and political alliances A formal model of collective bargaining is used to contrast the cleavages along industry lines generated by protectionist policies with the divisions along class and income lines associated with welfare policies. lt is argued that centralized confederal structures were more Iikely to be adopted in countries where dependence on export markets reduced the possible gains that could be achieved through trade restrictions. This hipothesis is tested for the set of advanced industrial societies in the early postwar period.
Centralização Sindical e Dependências Face ao Comércio: As Origens do Corporativismo Democrático
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