Dados is one of the most widely-read social sciences journals in Latin America. Created in 1966, it publishes innovative works, originating from academic research, by Brazilian and foreign authors. Edited by IESP-UERJ, it aims to reconcile scientific rigor and academic excellence with an emphasis on public debate based on the analysis of substantive issues of society and politics.
Dados n. 19 Rio de Janeiro 1978
Abstract
This paper presents an enquiry into the kind of political reforms which the Brazilian Congress might enact if 1) its revisionist members could muster the required number of votes to pass reform legislation and 2) it were possible to bypass the external constraints imposed on the legislature by the current regime, namely the two-party system and the principle of party loyalty. Within this framework, the present study constitutes an ideal experiment, a true counterfactual hypothesis. Answers to a political opinion survey con· ducted on a sample of Brazilian congressmen lead the author to conclude that the two thirds majority required at the time of the survey (1975) for passing constitutional amendments, not to mention the current absolute majority requirement, would not be a hindrance to reform. Tue legislators' answers seem to indicate that a revisionist spirit of the liberal political variety pervades the Congress, whose members would like to see an end to the exceptional powers granted the Executive by Institutional Act No. 5 and its specific items. The revisionist tendency is stronger among members of the opposition party (MDB) and more restrained among Arena (government party) congressmen. The legislators would also like to enjoy a higher degree of participation in the decision making process. They disapprove of the reduction in popular representation which has resulted from the strengthening of the Executive. The Arena party is the key to a revisionist force which would have to operate through moderate commitments, given the demands of the current situation, i.e. one of gradual political decompression, still under the constraint of institutional Act No. 5. The survey also showed that congressmen would prefer to maintain the present electoral system based on proportional representation, while wishing to revise the two-party system to accommodate other political factions. Two items seem to stand in the way of reform: the two-party system in its current form and the principle of party loyalty. Together they serve the regime by imposing constraints on both Congress and the parties, thus thwarting the legislators' revisionist aspirations. Assuming a two-thirds majority requirement for the passing of legislation, the Congress and the parties would oppose reforms affecting 1) the electoral system, 2) the requirement of voting with the party leadership and 3) the proscription of switching parties. This opposition may be explained in terms of the conservative and oligarchic attitudes which are characteristic of any party. Lastly, it may be stated that the Congress does have revisionist leanings, in terms of the ideal experiment, but that, given the external constraints imposed on it by the regime, it lacks the power to effect the reforms which its members favor in their candid answers to the author's survey.
Reforma Constitucional e Ordem Autoritária: Congresso Nacional na 8° Legislatura
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