Artículo

Dados vol. 48 n. 4 Rio de Janeiro out./dez. 2005

Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo

Limongi, Fernando - Figueiredo, Argelina

Resumen

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.

Palabras-clave: budget; Executive Branch; Legislative behavior; budget amendments.

DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582005000400002

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