Dados é uma das principais e mais longevas publicações nas ciências sociais no Brasil. Criada em 1966, divulga trabalhos inéditos e inovadores, oriundos de pesquisa acadêmica, de autores brasileiros e estrangeiros. Editada pelo IESP-UERJ, é seu objetivo conciliar o rigor científico e a excelência acadêmica com ênfase no debate público a partir da análise de questões substantivas da sociedade e da política.
Dados vol. 48 n. 4 Rio de Janeiro out./dez. 2005
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Resumo
The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.
Palavras-chave: budget; Executive Branch; Legislative behavior; budget amendments.
DOI: 10.1590/S0011-52582005000400002
Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo
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